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What determines the structure of labour market institutions? This paper argues that 
common explanations based on rent sharing are incomplete; unions, job protection, and 
egalitarian pay structures may have as much to do with social insurance of otherwise 
uninsurable risks as with rent sharing and vested interests. In support of this more benign 
complementary hypothesis the paper presents a range of historical, theoretical, and cross-
country regression evidence. The social insurance perspective changes substantially the 
assessment of often-proposed reforms of European labour market institutions. The benefits 
from eliminating labour market rigidities have to be set against the costs of reduced 
coverage of human capital related risk. The paper also argues that it is unclear whether the 
forces of globalisation, and the new economy, will really force countries to make their 
labour markets more flexible. While these phenomena may increase the efficiency costs of 
existing institutions, they may also make people more willing to pay a high premium to 
preserve institutions that provide insurance.  
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1. Introduction 
What determines the structure of labour market institutions? Today, it seems to be 
widespread agreement among economists that European labour market institutions mainly 
reflect the rent-seeking activities of labour unions and employed insiders, and that these 
institutions create a lot of wastage, in the form of high unemployment, and compressed 
wage structures that distort people’s incentives to acquire human capital. As a corollary it 
is often argued that far-reaching labour market deregulation is the only way to improve the 
workings of the labour markets of continental Europe.  
In this paper I provide a more benevolent perspective on European labour 
market institutions. While rent seeking is a powerful motivator, so is the desire for social 
insurance. Since private insurance markets are less likely to accommodate the demand for 
insurance against labour income risk, and since human capital is the by far most important 
asset for most individuals, a laissez faire economy need not be a very attractive place to 
live in. It is well known that this market incompleteness can serve as a theoretical 
rationale for redistributive tax policy, and maybe even for the welfare state.
1 But it also 
suggests that many features of European labour markets (like job security legislation, 
egalitarian wage policies of unions, and collective bargaining) can be thought of as second 
best instruments of risk sharing, which – in an admittedly crude and imperfect way – make 
up for the absence of a complete set of contingent markets.
2 
To support this social insurance interpretation of labour market institutions I 
bring in a range of evidence. First, I review some historical evidence on the origins of 
labour market institutions in two countries that are at the polar ends of the rigid-flexible 
spectrum, Sweden and the United States. This comparative evidence strongly suggests that 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Atkinson (1999), Barr (1987), Drèze (2000), Sandmo (1998), and Sinn (1996).  
2 The idea that labour market institutions can be thought of as devices that correct for market failures is not 
novel; see Blank and Freeman (1993), Gregg and Manning (1997) and Agell (1999) for further discussions.    3
many of the labour market rigidities that today are blamed as main causes of 
unemployment originally emerged as a defensive response to the threat of unemployment 
and income insecurity. Second, I present a simple model formalising the idea that 
institutionalised wage compression (which is often viewed upon as the hallmark of the 
European labour market compact) can be thought of as a welfare enhancing device, which 
provides social insurance, albeit at a cost in the form of unemployment. Third, I report 
new cross-country evidence on the determinants of labour market institutions; these 
regressions are not easy to reconcile with a story that treats rent seeking as the sole engine 
in the development of labour market institutions.  
If trade unions, job protection and egalitarian pay structures really have as 
much to do with social insurance as with rent sharing, some unorthodox implications seem 
to follow. First, according to the received wisdom, increased wage differentials are key 
ingredients in a policy to combat unemployment. But as I show below, it is quite 
conceivable that such labour market reform can be successful in lowering unemployment, 
at the same time that aggregate welfare decreases, because of a concomitant loss of social 
insurance. Second, it is commonplace to argue that globalisation, and the move towards a 
more flexible organisation of the work place (think of the “new economy”), will bring 
about a gradual dismantling of European style labour market institutions. But if these 
developments increase the risks of investing in human capital, the demand for risk sharing 
via labour market institutions may well increase in the future. Third, to the extent that 
current institutions reflect a genuine demand for economic security, comprehensive labour 
market deregulation might provoke a popular demand for alternative (potentially more 
disruptive) policies, like outright protectionism. 
Much of the discussion has a counterpart in the large literature on the nature 
and origin of the welfare state. This should come as no surprise, since in much of Europe   4
the institutions of the labour market and those of the welfare state are integral parts of the 
same system. The observation that the changing structure of the labour market is a key 
factor in understanding the origin and development of social insurance is developed at 
length in e.g. Piore (1987) and Atkinson (1991). The discussion of institutional wage 
compression as a second best, risk sharing device draws on Agell and Lommerud (1992), 
and relates to the works of e.g. Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) on 
redistributive taxation. The cross-country evidence on the determinants of labour market 
institutions, emphasising variables like openness and linguistic fractionalisation, is closely 
related to recent work on the determinants of growth and the size of government; see e.g. 
Easterly and Levine (1997), Rodrik (1998), and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999).  
 
2. On the origin of labour market institutions 
What comes first, the chicken or the egg? According to the conventional view institutions 
like job security legislation, unions, and benefits are main causes of unemployment. 
According to many social historians the main line of causation goes in the opposite 
direction – the very same institutions once developed as a defensive response to the threat 
of unemployment and income insecurity. Let me briefly review some of this evidence, 
gathered from the distant past when the new economy was a matter of railways and the 
steam engine, rather than dot.com. To focus my discussion, I concentrate on developments 
in two countries, which today often are considered to be poles apart when it comes to 
labour market structures, the United States and Sweden.  
  In his study of the origin and evolution of unemployment in Massachusetts 
in the 19
th century, Alexander Keyssar (1986) draws on a range of contemporary sources 
(newspaper articles, reports from charities, union protocols, government documents, etc.) 
to illuminate how structural change and modernization altered the workings of the labour   5
market. In the early (pre-industrial) days labour demand in Massachusetts was far from 
steady. Because of the extremities of the weather, and the frequent breakdown of the 
fragile transportation system, labour demand often slackened in an unpredictable manner. 
In spite of this, there is no evidence that unemployment was viewed as a problem. Why? 
Keyssar’s answer is that people could self-insure in a variety of ways. People had many 
jobs, and could easily shift between them. In times of bad harvests farmers became 
gunsmiths or carpenters; when the demand for craftsmen was slack, farming got more 
intense. Moreover, most people owned a piece of land, which helped them to survive in 
case their cash incomes dried up. Finally, pre-industrial society had a tightly knit social 
fabric, which in hard times provided some shelter even to those who did not own property.  
  The process of industrialisation signalled the beginning of “the era of 
uncertainty.” Between 1820 and 1870 the proportion of the labour force engaged in 
agriculture declined from nearly 60 percent to a little more than 10 percent. Production got 
more specialized, household manufacturing disappeared, and the factory system gained 
prominence. This transformation set the stage for increased standards of living, but it also 
introduced new disturbances to labour demand. The rapid pace of structural change 
implied that business failures – which at a moment’s notice terminated the flow of cash 
income of dislocated workers – were common also in good times. There was also the new 
phenomenon of the business cycle. Beginning in the 1870s the economy was affected by 
recurring “panics”, which curtailed activity throughout the state. These contractions seem 
to have got more severe in the 1890s, when technological advances made it possible to 
produce closer to the market, which obviated the need to produce for inventory.  
At the same time that industrialisation added disturbances to the labour 
demand schedule, it also destroyed the traditional mechanisms of self-insurance. It was no 
longer easy to shift to farming or household manufacturing when the industrial sector   6
stagnated. Rapid immigration and population growth meant that a growing share of the 
labour force lost its ties to the agricultural subsistence sector, and urbanization eroded the 
social fabric of pre-industrial society. All in all, Keyssar’s analysis suggests that 
unemployment materialized as a problem because industrialization simultaneously created 
new risks and destroyed the old institutions of risk sharing. 
  To a modern day economist, accustomed to the idea that rigid institutions 
are main causes of unemployment, an intriguing aspect of the historical evidence is that it 
suggests that flexibility is no panacea for unemployment and income risk. By any 
reasonable standard the labour markets of historical Massachusetts must be characterized 
as extraordinarily flexible. There were hardly any formal regulations, nominal wage cuts 
appear to have been common, geographical mobility was high, etc. But in spite of this 
Keyssar’s documentary material indicates that chronically unsteady employment and 
“involuntary idleness” was perceived as a major problem among large segments of the 
work force. The available statistical evidence – in the form of federal and state censuses, 
union surveys, etc. – corroborates this picture. It appears that the average unemployment 
rate exceeded 15 percent during the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s. For unskilled 
and semiskilled workers, unemployment rates were in all likelihood much higher. 
Unemployment also appears to have been a widely shared experience. In the bad years 
the frequency of unemployment (defined as the percentage of the work force with at least 
one spell of unemployment during a given year) might have been as high as 40 percent.
3 
  Keyssar’s documentation also suggests that many of today’s labour market 
institutions originally developed as a first line of defence against a highly unpredictable 
labour demand schedule. Towards the close of the 19
th century trade unions grew in 
strength, and one of their most important original functions appears to have been to offer 
                                                 
3 In 1885 an average unemployment spell appears to have been between 4-5 months (Keyssar (1986, p. 91)).    7
various forms of protection against unemployment and irregular cash income. These 
protective measures included a host of strategies. A first was to make it easier for the 
unemployed to find new jobs; for this purpose unions created job information offices, and 
provided travelling loans to members who were out of work. A second was to ease the 
financial consequences of unemployment; many unions paid out benefits – or, less 
ambitiously, gave loans – to their unemployed members. A third way of coping was to 
promote policies that spread work among as many people as possible during depressions; 
bans on overtime work, and demands that employers put every union member on ‘short 
time’ instead of laying off people, belong in this category. Finally, quite early on the 
principle of layoffs on a “last hired, first fired“ – a principle that most economists of 
today view as a major cause of inefficiency – basis became an important union strategy to 
shelter the incomes of more senior workers (who often had a family to support).  
In Sweden it is only towards the end of the 19
th century that the process of 
industrialisation took off. Recent work by Jonas Olofsson (1996) indicates however that 
the unemployment issue in Sweden emerged well before industrialised society, and that 
the first attempts at designing an unemployment policy in the modern sense of the word 
took shape already during the 1830s and 1840s. At that time rapid population growth and 
the commercialisation of agricultural production had turned a growing number of people 
into day labourers. In 1840 the government’s bill about poor relief acknowledged that 
these workers were unable – due to no fault of their own – to support themselves in times 
of bad harvests, when the demand for day labour was slack. As pointed out by Olofsson 
this was a quite dramatic shift of emphasis. Previously, unemployment had been dealt 
with as a criminal offence; now, for the first time, involuntary unemployment was 
identified as a separate cause of poverty, worthy of special public attention. To mitigate   8
the vulnerability of agricultural workers, the 1840-41 Riksdag decided that the 
unemployed should be provided with public relief works in years of bad harvests.  
  The second stage in the development of the unemployment issue in Sweden is 
the late 19
th century, when industrialisation and urbanisation brought fundamental changes 
in the economic and social landscape. Like in Massachusetts this transformation was 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the strength of unions, and – as far as one can tell – by 
considerable experimentation with various union strategies to cope with fluctuations in 
labour demand.
4 There was also an emerging, and intensifying, political debate about the 
advantages and disadvantages of social insurance against the risks (disability, sickness, 
unemployment, etc.) that confronted the industrial workforce. While many of the 
proponents of compulsory social insurance appear to have got their inspiration from quite 
concrete observations of the social conditions that accompanied industrialisation, there were 
also strong impulses from Germany.
5 The social insurance system created under Otto von 
Bismarck set a practical example, and the lecturing and writings of people associated with 
Verein für Socialpolitik gave intellectual inspiration.  
  Certainly, the historical evidence is of an impressionistic nature. All the 
same, I interpret it as a strong indication that the common rent sharing explanation for the 
emergence of labour market institutions misses a major part of the story. If anything, the 
experiences of Massachusetts and Sweden seem to suggest that it is unemployment and 
income insecurity that – together with workers’ risk aversion – created the institutions of 
the labour market, rather than the other way round. It is also noteworthy that in both 
                                                 
4 Like e.g. financial support to unemployed members, demands to sign collective bargaining contracts 
regulating the termination of employment, and calls on employers to counter recessions by shortening the 
workweek rather than by laying-off workers. For information about these early activities of Swedish unions, 
see Casparsson (1966) and Edebalk (1975).  
5 Olofsson (1996) gives a detailed account of this debate, and traces the relevant sources of inspiration.    9
countries important pieces of still existing social insurance legislation were introduced 
during the turbulent years of the 1930s.
6  
But in spite of these similarities, one can hardly argue that current Swedish 
and U.S. labour market institutions have much in common. There are of course several 
reasons that may explain why institutions evolve differently in different countries, and 
why the incentives to create all encompassing labour market institutions appear to have 
been much stronger in Europe than in the United States. An interesting possibility, clearly 
suggested by Keyssar’s analysis, is that large-scale foreign immigration may explain why 
the U.S. labour market eventually got such a flexible outlook. The workforce in 
Massachusetts was – and still is – a heterogeneous one, with sharp boundaries according 
to country of origin, language, ethnic background, etc. In this environment, characterized 
by competition and sometimes even open antagonism between ethnic groups, it was much 
more difficult to build up durable labour market institutions than in a much more 
homogenous country like Sweden. In section 4, I will explore to what extent indicators of 
ethnic fractionalisation may help to explain cross-country differences in the structure of 
labour market institutions.  
It is time to sum up. The observation that the origin of modern labour market 
institutions can be traced to periods of rapid change and modernisation, and to the aftermath 
of economic crisis, is quite consistent with a social insurance interpretation of the birth of 
institutions. More generally, the lesson seems to be that people’s demand for intervention to 
mitigate risk can be expected to increase in times of greater uncertainty. As I will return to 
below, this lesson from the past has potentially important implications for the analysis of 
the future of European style labour market institutions. But although I have emphasised the 
                                                 
6 As noted by Krueger (2000), main features of U.S. protective labour legislation and social insurance – like 
Social Security, the minimum wage, and unemployment compensation – were established during the Great 
Depression. In Sweden, unemployment insurance sponsored by the government was introduced in 1934.    10
demand for social insurance as the prime reason for the emergence of modern labour market 
institutions, it goes without saying that also rent-seeking played a role. In both 
Massachusetts and Sweden unions battled to increase wages at the expense of profits. There 
also appears to have been a fair amount of infighting between different unions, and between 
employed insiders and unemployed outsiders. Keyssar (1986, pp. 202-11) documents 
various methods – many of which have a strikingly modern ring – which unions used to 
protect their turf, and to keep outsiders at bay.  
Moreover, it appears that already quite early on vested interests tried to hijack 
the concept of social insurance. In summing up the state of social insurance in Germany at 
the close of the nineteenth century, Gustaf Cassel (1900) wrote quite approvingly of a social 
policy that aimed at protecting the working class. He even went so far so as to argue that 
social policy, properly executed, was a powerful instrument to promote economic progress, 
and to induce people to accept change.
7 But he also cautioned his Nordic readership that 
social policy in Germany had gone astray. In Germany the demand for public assistance had 
grown “…like mushrooms after a rainy day” (Cassel (1900, p. 386)). According to Cassel 
every German producer and worker believed that the government had an obligation to 
protect them from any adverse change in the business climate. As a consequence, German 
tax and trade policies had become so protectionist that their main function appeared to be to 




                                                 
7 In defending social insurance against the proponents of laissez faire, Cassel (1900, pp. 387-388) wrote 
”…the main point in the defence of this policy must rest in the acknowledgement that the productivity of 
labour increases in parallel with the social position of the working class. The insight about this relationship 
is the most optimistic, but at the same time one of the most well-established, results of modern economic 
research” (my translation). Unfortunately, Cassel did not mention what research he had in mind.    11
3. An insurance model of redistributive unions 
A hallmark of the European labour compact is the strong emphasis on redistribution. 
Unions compress the wage structure, and governments redistribute income from high- to 
low-income earners. Judged against the yardstick of a perfectly competitive equilibrium 
model these policies are bound to create inefficiencies.
8 But judged against the yardstick of 
an economy where private markets offer incomplete insurance against labour income risk 
matters need not be so bleak.
9 Thus, the absence of private insurance markets suggests a 
well-known role for government redistribution policy. By reducing the variance of 
disposable income a system of redistributive taxes and transfers may improve ex ante 
welfare by providing an insurance effect in addition to the conventional equity and 
incentive effects; see e.g. Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980).  
But income redistribution via taxation is not the only way of providing 
insurance against random labour income. A more direct form of insurance can be provided 
through labour market institutions – unions, minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance 
– that narrow the wage distribution. As shown by Agell and Lommerud (1992), under 
general assumptions the insurance benefits from a small compression of the wage structure 
will outweigh any costs in terms of unemployment and reduced output. The representative 
worker is willing to exchange a lower expected wage for a wage structure that offers 
insurance against uncertainty concerning who-one-will-be in the wage distribution.  
  To see how institutional wage compression compensates for missing private 
insurance markets in a setting of idiosyncratic wage risk, and to see how far a social 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Siebert (1997) for the view that the appropriate benchmark when discussing European labour 
markets is a classically clearing labour market. Needles to say, a voluminous empirical and theoretical 
literature rests on the same assumption. Agell (1999) gives some of the references.  
9 Here, and in the following, I simply take for granted that the private market is unable to fully accommodate 
people’s demand for human capital related risk sharing. Presumably, the absence of private insurance must 
have something to do with asymmetric information ex ante about workers’ characteristics, as well as with 
the difficulty of implementing and enforcing very long run, even life long, insurance contracts. For a 
discussion stressing the inability of private insurance to protect against lifetime income risk, see Sinn (1996).    12
insurance approach can go in explaining why selfish individuals support redistributive 
wage policy, it is useful to work through a simple example. While the model clearly relies 
on exaggerated assumptions – luck, rather than effort, is the only thing that matters for 
people’s occupational careers – it allows us to focus ideas in a simple manner. Consider a 
labour market that has L workers, and two types of jobs, for simplicity referred to as good 
(high-paying) and bad (low-paying) ones. Before the labour market opens, everyone knows 
that one half of the L workers will turn out to have the characteristics required for a good 
job, while the other half will turn out to have the characteristics required for a bad job. 
Since each individual supplies one unit of labour, aggregate labour supplies become 
  2 L LG =           (1) 
  2 L LB = ,          (2) 
where the subscripts are self-explanatory.  
  The demand side is represented by a competitive production sector, which 
uses ‘good’ and ‘bad’ workers to produce a single good. To suppress all feedback effects 
from output markets, I assume that the good is sold at an exogenous price, determined in 
the international market. Workers of either type can only be gainfully employed on the 
corresponding type of job. In a competitive market wages for good and bad jobs, wG and 
wB, will then depend on labour supplies shown in (1) and (2), and on firms’ production 
technology. I summarise this process of competitive wage determination by assuming that  
  k wG + =1           (3) 
  k wB - =1 ,          (4) 
where k is a positive constant. From (1) through (4) it follows that the wage bill in the 
laissez-faire economy is simply L, and that we by increasing k may analyse the effects of a 
mean-preserving increase in wage inequality.    13
  As there is no macroeconomic uncertainty wG and wB are known to workers 
before the labour market opens. However, I do assume that there is idiosyncratic risk: 
before the labour market opens individuals only know up to a probability distribution 
whether they will turn out to have the characteristics of a good worker (receiving wG), or 
the characteristics of a bad worker (receiving wB). I allow for individual heterogeneity by 
assuming that the probability of ending up as a good worker,  i p , may differ between 
individuals. To conform to the aggregate labour supplies shown in (1) and (2), the average 
of these probabilities across all individuals must (by the law of large numbers) satisfy the 
restriction  2 / 1 ) ( = i E p . Based on this aggregate implication I distinguish between three 
types of workers; talented ones, for which  2 / 1 > i p ; average ones, for which  2 / 1 = i p ; 
and untalented ones, for which  2 / 1 < i p . Finally, I assume that workers have identical 
utility functions u(x), with  0 > ¢ u  and  0 < ¢ ¢ u  (which implies strict risk aversion).  
  In this environment there will be a strong demand to create institutions that 
provide insurance against wage risk. Let me start with the well-known case of social 
insurance via redistributive taxation. Assume that the government relies on a tax system 
that transforms gross wages into net-of-tax wages according to 
  kT w
n
G + =1          (3’) 
  kT w
n
B - =1 ,         (4’) 
where the tax system is redistributive when T < 1. Because there are as many good as bad 
jobs, the government’s budget constraint is satisfied for any value of T.  
What will optimal policy look like ex ante? Under the assumption that the 
decisive voter is characterised by probability  i p  it is easy to show that T should be set so 
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When the decisive voter coincides with our average worker ( 2 / 1 = i p ), redistribution 
according to (3’)-(4’) is actuarially fair. She therefore desires full insurance, which implies 




G w w = . When the decisive voter is an untalented 
worker ( 2 / 1 < i p ) this insurance gain is reinforced by an equity effect in the form of an ex 
ante transfer from talented to untalented workers. For this reason untalented workers prefer 




G w w < .  
When the decisive voter is a talented worker ( 2 / 1 1 > > i p ) the insurance and 
equity effects pull in opposite directions. It is easy to show that the likelihood that the 
former dominates the latter increases with the concavity of the utility function; a 
sufficiently risk averse worker will support at least some redistributive taxation, even if the 
implied insurance premium is actuarially unfair. Also, the insurance effect is more likely to 
dominate the higher is wage inequality in the laissez-faire economy. As pre-tax inequality 
increases, even a talented person will eventually support redistributive taxation to cushion a 





w u w u


















¢ ¢ - + ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ - + ¢ ¢
- =
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
p p
p p
    (6) 
Since the optimal tax rate, 
* T , is always greater than zero for talented individuals, 
0 / <
* dk dT . Hence, as k increases we eventually reach the region where  1 <
* T . 
In a democratic society T will be determined in a voting process, which 
reflects the distribution of talent in the population.
10 If the decisive voter is the median one, 
and if the talent distribution is symmetric around the mean, tax policy will be highly 
                                                 
10 For a seminal analysis of the determination of social insurance in voting equilibrium, see Wright (1986).  
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egalitarian. As the median voter then faces a 50 percent chance of landing a bad job, there 
will be full wage insurance. The reason that the voting process delivers such an extreme 
outcome is of course that we have so far assumed that redistribution has no disincentive 
effects. If e.g. labour supply responds adversely to taxation, the median voter would opt for 
a less comprehensive social insurance policy.  
Let us now turn to the insurance that can be provided by an all-encompassing 
union, which uses its monopoly position in the labour market to flatten the wage structure. 
An implicit assumption in much of the union literature is that workers form unions because 
they want to bargain over wages in order to transfer rents from capital owners. Here, we 
rather assume that there are no rents to divide: the union maximises expected utility, 
subject to the constraint that every dollar’s wage hike for the bad jobs must be matched by 
a corresponding wage cut for the good jobs. We may think of this assumption as reflecting 
a situation when firms face some binding (zero) profit constraint, which the union cannot 
infringe upon. Formally, our all-encompassing union is confined to set wages according to 
  kW w
u
G + =1          (3’’) 
  kW w
u
B - = 1 ,        (4’’) 
where superscript u stands for union, and W is the distribution parameter. When  1 < W  the 
union pursues an egalitarian wage policy; when  0 = W  it sets the same wage for both jobs.  
In line with our treatment of the government’s decision problem, we assume 
that the union’s objective is to maximise the expected utility of its decisive member, 
characterised by the talent-probability  i p . In line with the basic monopoly union model, we 
assume that the union unilaterally determines W, and that firms then determine employment 
according to their labour demand curves. But when firms are on their labour demand 
curves, a compression of the wage structure will lead to unemployment for those that hold 
the bad jobs. We formalise this by defining the employment rate of those that have the   16
characteristics required for a bad job as  ) (W g . We assume that  1 ) 0 ( < g ,  1 ) 1 ( = g , and that 
) (W g  is twice continuously differentiable, with  0 > ¢ g .  
The union’s optimisation problem is 




G i W g g p p - + - + ,  (7) 
subject to (3’’) and (4’’), and where R is an exogenous reservation wage, determined by 
e.g. the value of leisure. The first-order condition becomes 
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where  0 ) ( / ) ( > ¢ ” W W W g g e  has the interpretation of an employment elasticity.  
It is again helpful to start with the case when the average worker is the 
decisive union member. Unlike the case of redistributive taxation, the insurance provided 
by the union stops short of complete equalisation of incomes across states. The last term on 
the RHS is a correction term relative to first-best insurance. It implies a larger deviation 
from full wage compression the harsher the consequences of unemployment (represented 
by the utility loss  ) ( ) 1 ( R u kW u - - ), and the larger the increase in unemployment 
(represented by the employment elasticity) following a marginal compression of wages.  
  A crucial question is under what conditions the average worker wants to 
implement a policy of wage levelling (i.e. set  1 < W ). The intuitive answer is that he wants 
the union to pursue egalitarian wage policy as long as the reservation wage R is close to the 
laissez-faire wage for the bad jobs,  k wB - =1 . Starting in a situation when  B w R =  the 
insurance gain from a marginal compression of the wage structure will be of first-order 
importance, while the unemployment cost will be of second-order importance.
11 By 
continuity, the average worker continues to support pay compression even as we reduce R   17
marginally below  B w . Furthermore, denoting optimal wage policy by 
* W , it is not difficult 
to show that  0 /
* < dR dW ; i.e. an increase in the reservation wage induces the union to 
purchase additional insurance through pay compression. Treating e  as a constant, it is also 
easy to show that  0 /
* > e d dW ; i.e. by increasing the marginal unemployment cost of 
redistributive wage policy a higher value of the employment elasticity implies that wage 
policy becomes less redistributive.  
  The analysis for the other types of workers parallels the case of redistributive 
taxation. Wage compression creates an ex ante equity effect, which benefits untalented 
workers at the expense of talented workers. For this reason, untalented workers support a 
more egalitarian wage policy than the average worker, while talented workers may oppose 
pay compression altogether. Again, it follows that the incentive of a talented worker to 
support egalitarian policy is an increasing function of wage inequality in the laissez-faire 
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where the sign follows from the fact that  0 >
* W  for a talented worker, and that 
0 )) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) 1 (








B i w u w u W k w u kW R u w u g p p g p e . Thus, 
comparing two risk averse, talented individuals characterised by the same probability of 
acquiring a good job, the one who lives in the economy with the largest competitive wage 
differential will be the one most likely to support redistributive wage policy.  
  Ultimately, the union’s wage policy will depend on the process used to weigh 
the utilities of different categories of members. Presumably, this process is a great deal 
more complicated than what is predicted by a median voter approach, according to which 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 Assume that  B w R = . Evaluating (8) when  1 = W , it follows that the RHS is greater than the LHS; when   18
the union member with the median talent-probability will be the decisive one. A theory of 
redistributive unions must account for the fact that dissatisfied union members have an 
exit-option. Talented workers finding that wage policy has become too redistributive may 
simply leave the union, and create a new (more homogeneous) union of their own. To 
properly study this issue one would need to address difficult problems concerning coalition 
formation in a union setting – issues that are well beyond my present purpose.
12  
In this simple model a redistributive union is indeed responsible for creating 
unemployment, but in spite of this expected utility of the average worker – who reaps an 
actuarially fair insurance benefit – will be higher than in a laissez-faire equilibrium with no 
unemployment. A redistributive government, however, does a still better job, since it 
provides insurance, without the unemployment that follows from the union’s interference 
with relative factor prices. For the average worker, the three equilibria can thus be ranked 
as follows: a redistributive government reaches the first best, a redistributive union the 
second best, and the unregulated market the third best.  
  The model also has implications for the positive analysis of labour market 
institutions. First, it suggests that the demand for risk sharing institutions ought to increase 
with the fraction of the workforce that faces uncertainty about their future position in the 
wage distribution. It also indicates that redistributive tax or wage policy will have the 
widest support in economies where workers are relatively homogeneous, in the sense that 
they face similar uncertainties concerning their future labour income. In practice, and in 
line with our historical evidence, one would perhaps expect that the insurance demand for a 
narrow wage distribution is the strongest in times of rapid structural change, or in periods 
of macroeconomic turmoil, when established economic relations are disrupted. Under those 
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circumstances, one would expect that a larger share of the work force needs insurance 
against a rainy day. As a consequence, union members may then vote for a more egalitarian 
wage policy, while the electorate at large may vote for more redistributive taxation.  
Second, our analysis suggests that the incentive to create union-sponsored 
institutions of risk sharing decreases with the extent of the social safety net provided by the 
government. In the presence of a redistributive tax system that internalises the demand for 
social insurance workers have no reason to join a redistributive union. But if the 
government scales down social insurance, workers get an incentive to form a redistributive 
union. To the extent that redistributive wage policy is more socially costly than 
redistributive taxation (and in our model this is certainly the case), a weakening of the 
public safety net may simply imply that a less efficient instrument of social insurance 
replaces a more efficient one. In an interesting recent paper, Avi-Yonah (2000) makes the 
related point that by weakening social insurance, tax competition may unleash widespread 
popular demand for protectionist, and potentially quite harmful, trade policies.
13  
Finally, there is the question of Cassel (1900) of whether social insurance can 
be designed in a way that encourages people to accept change, and to undertake risky 
activities. Sinn (1995) is one of the few who have studied this issue formally. He extends 
the model of redistributive taxation to the case when individuals can affect their income 
risk through their own actions, and he shows that the insurance provided by redistributive 
taxation may well enhance risk-taking. Sinn concludes that “…under the protection of the 
welfare state more can be dared.” Our model has a similar interpretation. We may think of 
our bad and good jobs as being situated in a particular sector of the economy, or in a 
                                                                                                                                                   
12 Another problem is due to the fact that any social insurance contract is susceptible to an intrinsic time 
consistency problem. Ex post, lucky workers have an incentive to renege on ex ante efficient wage contracts. 
For a discussion of these issues, see Burda (1995).  
13 Political scientists have for long suggested that there might be an inverse relation between the extent of 
social protection provided by the welfare state and the tranquillity of a country’s labour market relations; see 
Hibbs (1978) for an analysis along this line.    20
particular occupation. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, a risk averse individual’s decision to 
enter this particular sector, or occupation, will be adversely affected by the uncertainty 
concerning her place in the intra-sectoral, or intra-occupational, wage distribution. In either 
case, redistributive taxation or wage policy may – by reducing uncertainty – encourage 
people to take on the risk of entering the sector, or occupation, in question.  
 
4. The cross-country evidence 
In what direction will European labour markets develop in the future? According to the 
conventional view, increased openness and the requirements imposed by the new economy 
are bound to increase the costs of preserving institutions that hinder the flexible adjustment 
of relative wages. As a consequence governments’ sooner or later have to liberalise rigid 
labour market institutions, cut down on generous unemployment insurance, and implement 
measures that restrict the influence of rent-seeking unions. But considerations of political 
economy suggest that this process is not automatic.  
Figure 1 shows the marginal costs and benefits of redistributive tax or wage 
policy, as perceived by the decisive voter, or by the decisive union member. Under the 
standard assumption that the excess burden increases with the square of the tax wedge the 
marginal cost curve slopes upwards. Under the seemingly plausible assumption that a 
dollar’s worth of income redistribution matters most at a low overall level of income 
redistribution, the marginal benefit curve slopes downwards. In the initial political 
economy equilibrium, the decisive voter chooses the amount of redistribution so that the 
marginal cost and benefit curves intersect, i.e. point A.  
The popular view assumes that globalisation increases the efficiency costs 
associated with a given level of income redistribution; i.e. the marginal cost curve shifts 
upwards. We then end up in the political economy equilibrium at point B, where the new   21
cost curve intersects the old benefit curve. Clearly, there is less income redistribution in the 
new equilibrium. But to the extent that globalisation for some reason also increases the 
decisive voter’s demand for social insurance, there will in fact be a simultaneous upward 
shift in the marginal benefit curve. As a consequence we may end up at point like C, where 
the new cost curve intersects the new benefit curve. Whether this final political equilibrium 
is associated with less or more income redistribution is clearly an open question, on which 
it is hard to form a very definite a priori opinion.  
The cross-country evidence on the determinants of labour market institutions 
suggests that the analysis of Figure 1 is more than a theoretical peculiarity. Researchers 
have long suggested that the vulnerability of the open economy provide strong incentives to 
increase the scope of government. In an early study, Cameron (1978) showed that the trade 
to GDP ratio in 1960 was a good predictor of the growth of public revenue in a sample of 
18 OECD countries in the period 1960-75. He also found a positive correlation between 
openness and a measure of the scope of collective bargaining. Cameron suggested that this 
correlation was due to the fact that trade was accompanied by a high degree of industrial 
concentration, which facilitated the formation of employers’ associations and strong 
unions. More recently, Rodrik (1998) has found evidence of a robust positive correlation 
between openness and indicators of the size of government in a much larger sample. The 
explanation offered by Rodrik is that government spending plays a risk-reducing role in 
economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk. In Agell (1999) I show plots 
suggesting that more open economies on average tend to have higher union density, more 
centralised wage setting, more compressed wage structures, higher minimum wages, etc.  
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4.1. Benchmark regressions 
Here, I report new results on the determinants of labour market institutions for those 
countries for which there exists comparative data on aggregate labour market 
characteristics, i.e. the members of the OECD. The benchmark least squares regressions are 
presented in Table 1. The dependent variables reflect a variety of often-discussed 
dimensions of labour markets and social security systems.
14 Columns 1 and 2 regress the 
net replacement rates for long- and short-term recipients against the independent variables. 
These replacement rates are taken from OECD (1999a), and they show the combined 
impact of benefits, income taxes and various social welfare benefits for prototype families 
in 26 OECD countries during the second half of the 1990s. The aggregate numbers I use in 
the regressions are simple arithmetic averages across prototype families (who have in 
common that the principal earner is an “average production worker”). According to these 
aggregates, long-term recipients are most generously treated in Denmark, Iceland, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden (in these countries the net replacement rates exceed 70 percent), 
and the least generously treated in Greece (a replacement rate of 2 percent), the USA (27 
percent), and Korea (29 percent).  
Columns 3 to 10 show regressions where the dependent variable is taken from 
Nickell and Layard (1999), who provide comparable information on labour market 
institutions in 20 OECD countries. These variables – which quantify the strictness of job 
security legislation, union density, the degree of coordination of wage bargaining, spending 
on active labour market policy, etc. – refer to the situation in the 1989-94 period. Finally, 
column 11 shows a regression for a measure of income inequality, the 90/10 percentile 
ratio of disposable income inequality. According to this measure – taken from Gottschalk 
and Smeeding (1997), and available for 17 countries – Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and 
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Norway are the least unequal countries (with 90/10 ratios below 3), while the USA and the 
UK are the most unequal ones (the US 90/10 ratio is 5.8, and the British one 4.7).  
The small sample size means that there is no room for the joint inclusion of a 
great number of explanatory variables. My benchmark specification includes three 
independent variables, the log of openness, the log of GDP per capita, and a measure of 
linguistic fractionalisation. Both openness, defined as the sum of exports and imports over 
GDP, and per capita GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables, mark 5.6. To reduce 
problems of endogeneity openness and per capita GDP are measured in a period that 
precedes the measurement of labour market institutions.
15 Linguistic fractionalisation is a 
variable that I have taken from the data set of Easterly and Levine (1997). It is an average 
value of five different indices, compiled by linguistic scholars, which all try to measure a 
country’s linguistic diversity. The summary measure that I use has a minimum of 0, which 
indicates a country where everyone has the same language, and a maximum of 1, which 
indicates a country where everyone has her own language. Table 2 shows the extent of 
linguistic fractionalisation among the OECD countries according to this index.  
The linguistic variable deserves some comment. Both the historical evidence 
and theoretical considerations suggest that countries with a more homogeneous work force 
are more prone to build up labour market structures that are organised along collective 
lines. In a country with a more polarised population – in terms of preferences, the 
distribution of abilities, etc. – it is more difficult to form and maintain all-encompassing 
institutions. One might also expect that more polarised societies devote less resources to 
the consumption of public
16 goods, of which social insurance might be a good example. To 
quantify the extent of homogeneity of a society, political scientists have for long relied on 
                                                 
15 In columns 1 and 2 openness and per capita GDP are measured in 1990, and in the remaining columns 
they are measured in 1985.  
16 For theory and evidence on this, see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999).   24
measures of linguistic fractionalisation. More recently, these measures have been 
introduced in the political economy literature; see Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine 
(1997), and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998).  
The benchmark regressions of Table 1 are not easy to reconcile with the view 
that increased international economic integration will undermine the European labour 
market compact. Not a single one of the eleven estimated coefficients on log Openness has 
the sign one would expect if international trade really was to weaken the labour compact. If 
anything, the relation appears to be of the opposite sign. After controlling for initial GDP 
and linguistic fractionalisation, Log Openness is positively correlated with (i) the 
generosity of social insurance (columns 1 and 2), (ii) strictness of labour standards and job 
protection (columns 3 and 4), (iii) the strength and centralisation of labour market 
organisations, and the coordination of wage bargaining (columns 5-8), (iv) level of 
minimum wages (column 9), and the amount of resources invested in active labour market 
policies (column 10). Finally, the coefficient reported in column 11 indicates that open 
economies have a more compressed distribution of disposable income. Seven of these 
eleven coefficients are significant on the five or one percent levels. 
The linguistic fractionalisation index is also statistically significant at 
conventional levels in seven of the estimated equations. Interestingly, and in line with the 
predictions from theory and comparative social history, Linguistic fractionalisation is 
negatively correlated with all the four variables that measure the strength, centralisation, 
and coordination among the parties of the labour market (see columns 5-8). The economic 
significance of Linguistic fractionalisation is illustrated by the case of Belgium, a quite 
open economy, which also happens to have a high rank on the fractionalisation index. The 
point estimates of column 5 indicates that if Belgium had the Swedish index-value of .065   25
instead of its actual value of .364, its union density rate would have been 63.5 percent, 
which can be compared with Belgium’s actual union density rate of 51 percent.  
  Finally, columns 1, 2, and 9 suggest that log GDP/capita is significantly and 
positively correlated with both the long- and short-run replacement rates, and with the level 
of the minimum wage. One way to think of these correlations is in terms of Wagner’s law: 
if the demand for social security is income elastic high-income nations ought to have more 
generous systems of maintaining people’s income.
17  
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis: “natural” openness, country size, and outliers 
There are clearly several reasons to be cautious about the results reported in Table 1. My 
sample is small. I have left out potential explanatory variables. There is reason to worry 
about outliers. There are problems of measurement error, and with the endogeneity of my 
explanatory variables. In this section I will address these issues. As we shall see, it is 
certainly possible to come up with alternative specifications that “kill” some of the 
significant results of Table 1. However, it is noteworthy that in none of these new 
specifications do we obtain results suggesting that that there is a negative association 
between openness and our indicators of institutional involvement in the labour market.  
A potentially important issue is reverse causation. Our measure of openness is 
based on the actual volume of trade, which is an endogenous variable that can be affected 
by country-specific labour market institutions. To examine whether the correlations of 
Table 1 suffer from endogeneity bias, Table 3 shows the results when we replace the log of 
the actual trade share with the log of the constructed trade share of Frankel and Romer 
(1999). As their constructed trade share (“natural openness”) is based on geographic factors 
(like a country’s area in square meters, distance to other countries, whether it is 
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landlocked), it can be interpreted as a measure of a country’s exogenous trade. Clearly, 
there is no indication that the results of Table 1 are driven by reverse causation. The 
coefficient on openness has the same signs in both Table 1 and Table 3, and the 
significance levels are generally more reassuring in the latter one (“natural openness” is 
significant at the conventional level in ten of the estimated equations in Table 3).  
Some authors have suggested that country size may have an independent 
effect on the incentive to form institutions. To the extent that there are important fixed 
costs linked to the creation of institutions, countries with a large population may devote a 
smaller share of their resources to common institutions. For this reason, it has been argued 
that populous countries have a smaller public sector relative to GDP; see Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1997). It has also been argued that union density will be lower in countries with 
a large labour market; see Wallerstein (1989). But since a country’s trade share is 
correlated with its size, our finding of a non-negative association between openness and 
institutional involvement could simply be a spurious one, due to the fact that our 
benchmark specification omits a measure of country size.  
  To address this issue, I have run regressions where I have added (the log of) 
population size to the explanatory variables shown in Table 1. This modification does not 
change the sign of any of the eleven estimated coefficients on log Openness. But it does 
weaken the statistical significance of openness, which remains statistically significant in 
only two of the estimated equations. The size variable, in turn, is only statistically 
significant in one of the estimated equations. Since log Openness and log Population are 
highly correlated, it is difficult to estimate their coefficients with any precision. Because 
the degree of collinearity between population size and the Frankel-Romer instrument of   27
exogenous trade is less high,
18 I obtain more precise estimates when I add log Population to 
the explanatory variables of Table 3. As shown in Table 4, the sign of the openness 
coefficient remains unchanged, and it is significant at conventional levels in six 
regressions. The sign of the coefficient on the size variable has no clear pattern, and it is 
significant at the conventional level in four regressions. Hence, I conclude that my finding 
of a non-negative relation between openness and institutional involvement in the labour 
market is not due to inappropriate omission of a measure of country size. 
  As a final sensitivity test, I have explored to what extent the results are driven 
by observations for the USA, a potential outlier in cross-country comparisons of 
institutional design. To address this issue, I simply added a US-specific dummy variable to 
each of the regressions reported in Tables 1, 3 and 4. It turned out that this modification, 
did not change the sign of any of the 33 coefficients on log Openness. Moreover, 20 of 
these coefficients remained significant at the ten percent level, or more.  
  Finally, it should be noted that as I bring in additional explanatory variables, 
linguistic fractionalisation looses some of its explanatory power. However, in both Tables 3 
and 4, linguistic fractionalisation remains – very much in line with the theoretical 
prediction – a potentially important determinant of the variables that measure the strength, 
centralisation, and coordination among the parties of the labour market.  
 
5. What about the new economy? 
To the extent that cross-country regressions are at all informative about the future the 
surprising message seems to be that there is little reason to suppose that increased 
international economic integration will weaken the institutions of the labour market. What 
                                                 
18 When I regress log Openness measured by the actual trade share against log Population and a constant (for 
the twenty countries that constitute the sample of Nickell and Layard (1999)), I obtain an adjusted R
2 of .52. 
When I repeat the same exercise for the measure of natural openness, I obtain an adjusted R
2 of .32.   28
about the labour market implications of the new economy? In the popular debate it is 
common to argue that the computerised economy will join forces with globalisation in an 
assault on redistributive labour market institutions. However, the simple framework of 
Figure 1 again serves to remind us that there are both costs and benefits associated with 
these institutions.  
As was the case with globalisation, it is probably true to that new technology 
tends to increase the costs of certain labour market institutions; i.e. the marginal cost curve 
shifts upwards, which tends to reduce the amount of redistribution demanded by the 
decisive voter/union member. But at the same time one cannot rule out that 
computerisation also leads to an upward shift in the marginal benefit curve, which tends to 
increase the amount of redistribution. Times of rapid technological innovation are also 
times when old skills erode rapidly, and when investments in human capital depreciate at a 
higher – and probably more erratic – rate. Therefore, one might conjecture that the demand 
for institutions that protect people’s returns from human capital increases in periods of 
technological breakthroughs – of which the new economy is a good example.  
It is true that this unconventional prediction does not appear to fit the facts. 
Those sectors of the economy that so far have been the most affected by computerisation 
and the web are also to the ones where labour market relations appear to be the most 
flexible, in terms of compensation methods, incidence of individual bargaining, work 
hours, etc. But in my view, it is premature to say anything definite about the labour market 
implications of the new economy until this sector has lived through its first major crisis. 
After all, in Massachusetts and Sweden it was the industrial “panic” of the late 19
th century, 
rather than industrialisation per se, that provided important impulses to create labour 
market institutions.  
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6. Conclusions 
The conventional wisdom about rigid European labour markets is probably right in 
concluding that redistributive unions and governments can be held responsible for creating 
quite tangible efficiency losses. But a complete analysis should also recognise that the very 
same policies create substantial (but harder to quantify) insurance benefits. In this paper, I 
have argued that this is indeed the message conveyed from comparative social history, 
conventional neo-classical theory, and simple cross-country regressions. 
But why insurance via unions or governments? If labour market risk really is 
an important factor in life, firms and employees have strong incentives to take care of this 
on their own, writing individualised insurance contracts. Indeed, a key idea in the large 
literature on “implicit contract” models of wage and employment determination is that risk 
averse workers strike efficient wage bargains with their firms. However, the very same 
problems of implementation and enforcement that may help to explain why private 
insurance against long term career risks is virtually absent also explain why such implicit 
insurance contracts are not likely to be available.
19 By contrast, most of these problems are 
mitigated in economies with European style – collectively organised – labour market 
institutions. By providing a standardised insurance package the costs of devising and 
monitoring a potentially very large number of individualised worker-firm contracts are 
avoided. Also, with universal coverage problems of adverse selection get less significant.  
  Even so, it seems clear that Gustaf Cassel’s verdict about social protection 
towards the end of the 19
th century is as applicable today: while the theory might be fine, 
the concrete policies appear to leave something to be desired. Even supporters of social 
insurance must admit that many of today’s policies, in the labour market and elsewhere, are   30
designed in ways that prevent change, and preserve the status quo. Cassel held the 
optimistic view that as long as one first carefully assessed the “direction of technological 
and economic advances,” social protection could actually be designed so as to encourage 
the same advances. A hundred years later, the complete solution to this problem of optimal 
institutional design remains to be worked out. But recognising that the job is a difficult one 
is not the same thing as saying that it cannot be done.  
                                                                                                                                                   
19 While the literature on implicit contracts focuses on uncertainty in the form of an aggregate shock to a 
whole industry, my concern is intrinsic uncertainty concerning people’s ability in the distant future. For an 
interesting analysis of how labour market integration affects labour market institutions in a setting of 
implicit contracts, see Schöb and Wildasin (1998).    31
Appendix 
The data sources for the dependent variables used in section 4 are as follows. The short- 
and long-run net replacement rates used in columns 1 and 2 of Tables 1, 3, and 4 are from 
the OECD (1999a), Tables 3.2 and 3.5. To arrive at two aggregate replacement rates for 
each country, I have computed the arithmetic average for the different family types 
reported in columns 1-4 in each of these tables. Although net replacement rates are 
available for 26 countries, I exclude the Czech Republic from my regressions, the reason 
being that there is no information about linguistic fractionalisation in this country.  
The dependent variables used in columns 3-10 come from Nickell and Layard 
(1999), NL, and they are available for 20 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand. The variables Labour standards and Job protection rank are from NL, Table 6. 
Union density, Union coordination, Employer coordination, and Centralisation rank are 
from NL, Table 7. The variable Centralisation rank is taken from Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988). In its original form this ranking (which goes from 1 to 17) is constructed so that a 
lower rank signifies that the wage bargain is more centralised. Before I ran my regressions, 
however, I multiplied the Calmfors-Driffill ranking with –1, so that a more centralised 
wage bargain becomes associated with a higher rank. The variable Minimum to average 
wage is from NL, Table 9, supplemented with information for Switzerland from Dolado et 
al. (1996), Table 1. There are missing values for Japan and Australia. The variable Active 
labour market policy is from NL, Table 10.  
  The 90/10 percentile ratio of disposable income inequality in column 11 is 
taken from Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Figure 2. For most countries income   32
inequality is measured in 1991-92. Compared with the 20 countries included in the data set 
of NL, there are missing values for Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal.  
  The independent variables are from the following sources. Population, 
Openness (defined as the sum of actual imports and exports over GDP), and GDP per 
capita (in purchasing power parities) are from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. These 
variables are measured in 1985 (columns 3-11 of my tables) or 1990 (columns 1 and 2). 
The constructed openness measure (defined as the sum of constructed imports and exports 
over GDP) used in Tables 3 and 4 is from Frankel and Romer (1999), Table A1. The index 
of linguistic fractionalisation is computed as an arithmetic average of five different indices 
of linguistic diversity, included in the data set of Easterly and Levine (1997).  
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MB, as perceived 
by decisive voter 
MC, as perceived 





C Table 1. Cross-country evidence on the determinants of labour market institutions 
 





















































































































































































































* denotes significance at five percent level 
** denotes significance at one percent level.  
Notes: White-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. For a description of the variables, see main text and the Appendix.  
  
Table 2. Linguistic fractionalisation rank of 25 OECD countries 
             
   
Linguistic fractionalisation index 







Belgium  .364 
Switzerland  .308 
Spain  .275 
Luxembourg  .217 
United States  .209 
New Zealand  .148 
France  .145 
Australia  .113 
United Kingdom  .106 
Finland  .105 
Ireland  .090 
Greece  .078 
Norway  .070 
Hungary  .065 
Sweden  .065 
Netherlands  .063 
Germany  .044 
Poland  .039 
Italy  .039 
Austria  .033 
Denmark  .028 
Japan  .010 
Portugal  .003 
Korea  .000 
  
Table 3. Exogenous measure of ‘natural’ openness (Frankel and Romer (1999)) 
 
























































































































































































































* denotes significance at five percent level 
** denotes significance at one percent level.  
Notes: White-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. For a description of the variables, see main text and the Appendix. Log Openness is here defined as the log of 
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Table 4. Natural openness versus country size  
 














































































































































































































































* denotes significance at five percent level 
** denotes significance at one percent level.  
Notes: White-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. For a description of the variables, see main text and the Appendix. Log Openness is here defined as the log of 
the constructed trade share, taken from Frankel and Romer (1999), Table A1. 
 
 